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The eighties were, by all accounts, a terrible decade for Venezuelan development. GDP per capita, which
increased by 234 percent from 1950 to 1980, or 4.0 percent per year, had a cumulative fall of 18.1 percent
between 1980 and 1989. The currency, which had only been moderately devalued once in over a century,
depreciated tenfold between 1983 and 1989. The yearly inflation rate, which had averaged 3.4 percent for the
period 1950-1980, reached 84 percent in 1989. The foreign debt, which was negligible in 1974 totaled 54 percent
of GDP or more than 3 years of exports by 1989.
Was this havoc due to a particularly incompetent or irresponsible management of economic policy - i.e. stepping
out of line- or to the difficulties found in keeping pace with a very unstable and unpredictable source of revenue,
i.e. dancing out of step? After all, the world petroleum market, to which the country traditionally directed over
90 percent of its exports passed through very unsettled waters. As shown in Figure 1, oil exports at 1990 prices
reached US$ 24 billion in 1980 and fell to 10.2 billion in 1989, a decline of 66.4 percent in real per-capita terms,
or of 17.7 percent of 1980 GDP.
The fall in external income followed the two well known positive shocks of the seventies and came also in two
rather discontinuous steps. The first one in 1982-83 was linked to OPEC's attempts to defend oil prices by
cutting output. It reduced the real value of exports (at 1990 prices) from US$ 22.4 billion a year for 1979-81 to
US$ 15.9 billion for 1983-85. The second one took place when prices collapsed in 1986 and cut real exports
down to US$ 9.5 billion for 1986-89. Relative to 1980 GDP, these two negative shocks amounted to 8.5 percent
and 8.2 percent respectively.
Furthermore, there were important similarities between the two shocks. In both cases, the shocks hit the
economy just after it had gone through a stabilization effort1 which had left the economy with significant
external surpluses and with high international reserves. The fiscal accounts were also brought into surplus. In
both cases, just before the shock it was felt that the economy situation had been stabilized, prompting the
government to increase in public spending in order to reduce rising unemployment.  When the negative schock
came, thus wiping out the existing suplus and leaving an important deficit, the government had already
committed itself to fiscal expansion and was also well into the five-year constitutional period when hard
decisions to make.
Hence, economic policy did not react with sufficient swiftness to these two negative shocks causing, each time,
a collapse in the policy regime.  In 1983, in the wake of a massive attack against the currency, the traditional
fixed exchange rate system was abandoned and a multiple exchange regime was adopte.  After the second
negative schock, the foreign exchange regime was adopted.  After the second negative shock, the foreign
exchange premium rose to a point where the government decided to abandon that exchange system in 1989 and
replace it with a unified float.  Hence, the two shocks took place under rather different control regimes and led
to important changes in the regimes themselves.  Summary data on the macroeconomic adjustment to the two
shocks is presented in Table1.
1  As will be discussed later, in 1979-1980 the government adopted a contractionary fiscal policy in order to deal with external imbalances and
inflationary pressures.  In 1983-85, it cut spending, restricted trade, devalued the exchange rate and adopted a multiple exchange rate regime as a reaction to
the first negative shock.The study of external or trade shocks has tended to focus on the windfall side2.  The general theme has
concentrated on the fact that the additional resources have not usually been put to t he best use while they have
seriously distorted optimal long-run resource allocation.  The dutch disease literature3 developed this argument
into a coherent theoretical framework.  Policy discussions dealt mainly with the issue of how best to allocate the
windfall which in most cases meant how to save it4.
This emphasis was to be expected in ligh of the positive commodity shocks of the seventies.  However, during
the eighties, negative schocks have tended to dominate.  Obviously, the models built to explain positive shocks
can shed much light into understanding what happens on the down side, but there is an important feature
specific to negative shocks: they tend to question the solvency of the government.  Private agents may come to
realize or believe that the current policy framework is no longer viable and may attempt to secure their assets
through speculative attacks in anticipation of debt repudiation, devaluation or regime change.  This may lead
to capital flight, large inventory shifts or may severely limit the availability of external fnancing needed to
cushion the blow. Moreover, these anticipatory reactions of economic agents against future changes in policy
may be self-fulfilling (Obstteld 1986a) and may severely constrain public policy. A central message of this paper
is that such behaviour may become dominant at the macro-economic level, dwarfing other responses which
would otherwise be expected. Moreover, the precise nature of the private sector's anticipatory reaction is highly
dependent on the nature of the control regime in place since it will tend to determine the avenues which are
open for attack.
The Venezuelan experience in the eighties is a particularly fertile ground for the analysis of negative shocks. Two
large shocks took place under very different control regimes thus highlighting the role which the institutional
setting plays in determining the response. Moreover, the experience can shed a different light into the
convenience of alternative exchange rate regimes for countries subject to large and frequent trade shocks. In
addition, the analysis can be simplified for two reasons: first, oil shocks only have direct effects on the public
sector, thus implying that it is the policy reaction to the shock that will affect households and firms. Secondly,
the supply response of the oil industry is not of macroeconomic interest.5
2
Gelb (1989) presents and international study of the two positive oil shocks of the seventies.
3
See Corden and Neary (1982), Corden (1984), Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986).
4
van Wijnbergen 91984) discusses also the use of production subsidies for non-booming manufactures subject to
learning-by-doing.
5
Basically, there was no supply response. Either output was determined by OPEC quotas, as was the case most of the
time, or by installed capacity. Usually, the marginal cost of output is well below price, so increases in price do not bring in new production.The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents a brief summary of theoretical literature on the impacts
negative shocks have under alternative exchange rate regimes. Section III provides a brief description of
macroeconomic developments in Venezuela and their relationship to oil market events. Section IV discusses the
nature of the two negative oil shocks that will be analyzed in this paper, justifying their permanent nature.
Section V presents some aspects of the methodology used to quantify the shocks and the macroeconomic
adjustment to them. Sections VI and VII present the detailed analysis of the two negative shocks of the eighties.
In section VIII we try to derive the main conclusions and lessons
II. Adjustment to negative permanent shocks: a quick theoretical overview
In this section we review the theoretical literature so as to have some a priori assumptions on what we should
find when looking at the Venezuelan data. We start by analyzing the optimal adjustment to a negative oil shock
as can be derived from the standard small open economy model. We will then turn to some of the complications
that arise under fixed, multiple and flexible exchange rate systems.
A. Optimal adjustment to a negative oil shock
A negative oil shock in the Venezuelan context is simultaneously an external and a fiscal shock. As an external
shock, optimal adjustment requires a real depreciation and a fall in absorption. Output should remain at full
employment (Salter (1959) and Swan (1960)). Now, since the shock is fiscal, something must be done about the
increased public deficit. Inaction is dangerous although the precise nature of the costs involved depends on the
type of exchange rate regime. If the deficit is cut through a reduction in purchases of tradeables, the internal
economy will remain unaffected. If instead, fiscal adjustment is done through an increase in taxes or through
a reduction in expenditure on non-tradeables then the shock will be transmitted to the private sector, causing
a reduction in private spending. Not much else can be said unless we clarify the nature of the exchange rate
regime.
B. Adjustment under Fixed Exchange Rates
The typical fixed or predetermined exchange rate open economy model (Dornbusch (1980), Khan and Lizondo
(1987), Montenegro (1989) Hausmann (1990, Chapter 4)) holds that the economy will tend to converge to a
long-run equilibrium point where the current account of the balance of payments equals the fiscal deficit, making
net private financial wealth constant. However, if there is a fiscal deficit, then reserves will be drawn down or
a public foreign debt will be accumulated until a balance of payments crisis appears. It is therefore said that this
regime is only quasistable, since nothing prevents it from collapsing when certain exogenous parameters, such
as the fiscal deficit, are not adequate.
Obviously, the possibility of collapse will affect the behavior of economic agents. This has prompted a strand
of literature which deals with collapsing regimes. However, before we turn to this important aspect, let us point out
some of the implications of a negative oil shock in the standard model. First, a negative shock will leave the
economy unaffected, unless the government adjusts spending on nontradeables or taxes. Otherwise, there will
simply be a balance of payments deterioration equal to the increased fiscal deficit, leaving the private sector
unscathed.If the government attempts to reduce the deficit either by means of a cut in spending on non-tradeables or an
increase in taxes, and assuming nominal wages adjust sluggishly, there will be a recession which will cause
unemployment to rise, private real wealth to be drawn down and nominal wages to fall, leading gradually to a
real depreciation.
If instead, the government devalues the currency then (assuming sluggish nominal wage adjustment) there will
be an immediate fall in the external and fiscal deficits. This is due to several effects. First, the devaluation will
increase the output of and reduce the demand for tradeables causing the resource gap to fall. These effects will
tend to have an expansionary influence on output. Secondly, real financial wealth of the private sector will fall
due to the jump in the average price level, causing a cut in spending, and an increase in savings needed to restore
desired levels of financial wealth. Thirdly, there will be an important income effect due to the rise in real value
of oil exports and of imports. Since the government is a net exporter and the private sector is a net importer,
a transfer of income will take place, reducing private revenue and the public deficit. These last two effects will
have a contractionary impact on output, provided the government does not spend the additional devaluation-
induced revenue. The Venezuelan experience during the eighties suggests that contractionary effects dominate
in the short run. However, in the long-run, these changes will be reverted and the economy will go back to a
balance of payments crisis. Devaluations by themselves have only temporary effects.
These results assume that agents do not foresee a collapse in the policy regime. However, much more interesting
results appear if this assumption is relaxed. In one possible framework, agents will be assessing the solvency of
the government, i.e. its inter-temporal budget constraint.6 If they feel that future action on the deficit will not
be forthcoming or the ability to borrow may be insufficient7, they will guess that the government will be forced
to default on the real value of its obligations. One way is to default on the nominal value of its liabilities, as the
Mexico did in 1982 with the Mexdollars or as Argentina and Brazil did in early 1990 with banking deposits8.
  A simpler way to do so is through a devaluation, which reduces the real value of the monetary base and of
domestic bonds. Knowing about these possibilities, domestic agents will try to convert their wealth into foreign
assets through capital flight prompting a balance of payments crisis.
6 See, for example, Obstfeld (1986a), Buiter (1986b). Froot and Obstfeld (1989) analyze the case in which the regime
change is known only with uncertainty.
7 Buiter (1986a) analyzes the case in which an economy is allowed to borrow in order to defend the exchange rate. He
argues that since borrowing is costly, it may actually increase the size of the speculative attack.
8 The implications of this type of repudiation risks have been used by Ize and Ortiz (1989) and Khan and Ul-Haque
(1985) to account for the simultaneous occurence of capital flight and external borrowing.Also, inventory accumulation of traceable goods in anticipation of the collapse may take place, with stocks falling
to normal levels thereafter. This will accentuate the loss of reserves through the current account and may have
important output effects since demand for non-tradeables is likely to fall. Also, if domestic tradeables are less
than perfect substitutes of foreign goods, their output may rise. After the collapse, these effects will be reversed,
meaning that crises may cause significant output effects.
Private fixed capital investment is likely to fall (except for speculative accumulation of traceable equipment in
anticipation of the devaluation) because the public expects an eventual recession and does not know the nature
of the new regulatory framework9.  Even if the agents know that there will be a rise in the relative price of
tradeables, they do not know whether this will be brought about through more protection or through
devaluation, making it difficult to choose between specific projects.  Given the option value of waiting, investors
will stand by until the dust settles.
C. Adjustment under Multiple Exchange Rates.
The standard models of multiple exchange rates (Dornbusch (1986), Edwards (1989)) assume that all
commercial transactions take place at a single official exchange rate and that all financial transactions occur at
a free floating parallel rate. It is further assumed that imports are demand determined, making the internal price
of tradeables equal to the foreign price calculated at the official exchange rate.
These models are also quasi-stable in the same sense as the fixed exchange rate system, with long-run
equilibrium taking place at a point where the current account deficit equals the fiscal deficit. Thus if the
government runs a deficit, the balance of payments will eventually collapse 10. Also, these models show that
devaluations have only temporary effects, although their impact on the exchange premium is less than intuitive
(see Edwards (1989)). Moreover, if the government does not react to the shock, the economy will, in principle,
be unaffected unless agents anticipate a regime collapse.
A slightly different model assumes that official rate imports are rationed by the government (Hausmann (1990,
Chapter 7)). This is a plausible hypothesis since it seems unlikely that, in the presence of large exchange premia,
official rate imports could be demand determined11 . In any case, rationing was important in the Venezuelan
case. In this model, the internal price of tradeables is endogenous, with importers appropriating a rent.
This model has very different stability properties. First of all, it is unstable: if the government runs a surplus, the
parallel rate will gradually fall back to the official rate until the system becomes a fixed exchange rate regime.
If the government runs a deficit, the increased money supply will cause a real appreciation of the official rate,
which will deteriorate the fiscal accounts, further increasing the monetary expansion. In this process, the
premium will be rising until a point where the official exchange rate looses all credibility, prompting the
9 Irreversibility and uncertainty have been introduced in investment models yielding an option price for waiting. See Dixit
(1989), Krugman (1989) and Pindyck (1989).
10 Park and Sachs (1987) show that the breakdown will take place later than in a fixed exchange rate system. If the storage
of importables is allowed in the model, then the time gain may not be significant and the speculative attack will take place mainly through
the current account. The exchange premium will rise as the collapse nears.
11 With large exchange premia, over-invoicing reduces the real effective price of imports causing an increase in demand.government to devalue it. This may be called a leaping peg system with large maxi-devaluations taking place
periodically. What causes this instability is that agents are unable to reduce the supply of money through a
deterioration of the balance of payments, since both the current and the capital accounts are now exogenous.
If there is a public sector deficit, a money overhang problem will arise and it will require ever-rising exchange
premia.
Interestingly, within a certain range, official rate devaluations do not affect the domestic price of tradeables and
may lower inflation since they transfer import rents to the government, thus reducing the fiscal deficit.
Moreover, faced with a negative shock, the government has an additional degree of freedom. It may cut the
import ration so as to administratively defend the level of reserves. This policy will have an expansionary impact
on output in the short run. It will also increase the premium and speed the rate at which it rises, bringing forward
the next official devaluation. Inventories also play here an even more destabilizing role than in the fixed
exchange rate case. Since agents are not free to increase imports, hoarding will affect any storable good whose
price is likely to rise after the collapse, making the demand for internal output much more affected by the
inventory cycle.
D. Adjustment under Flexible Exchange Rates
The standard model of a small open economy with a floating exchange rate generally shows long run global
stability, with the inflation tax covering the unfinanced portion of the fiscal deficit (see Kiguel and Lizondo
(1989), Hausmann (1990)). Consequently, there is in principle no possibility of regime collapse12 .
If we assume that the reserve target of the Central Bank is exogenous, then a negative shock will have effects
on the economy even if there is no explicit fiscal reaction. The shock will cause the net public sector supply of
foreign currency to the exchange markets to fall. This will produce an immediate depreciation of the exchange
rate, which will overshoot its long run real level. The jump will be greater if the public sector does not act to
reduce the underlying fiscal deficit since, this being the case, economic agents will interpret that the fall in
external income will eventually have to be financed through the inflation tax. In order to avoid the tax, agents
will shift their portfolios towards foreign assets precipitating the jump in the exchange rate. Thus, the causes of
the overshooting are very different from those that arise in the Dornbusch (1976) model.
This jump will have the standard effects of a devaluation: wealth will fall and the fiscal deficit will be reduced
(both contractionary effects), while the structure of output and demand will change in reaction to the shift in
relative prices (expansionary). The net short run effect on output is uncertain. Interestingly, in spite of the shock,
the current account will move to a surplus. This is the result of agents trying to accumulate foreign assets in
order to restore wealth and change its structure, given the expected rise  inflation.
If, on the other hand, the government fully reacts by adjusting the underlying deficit, then expected inflation
will not be affected and the exchange rate will not move but the economy will react with a short run recession
caused by the fall in absorption, with the balance of payments remaining in equilibrium.
12 If demand for money is assumed to be negatively related to the inflation rate, then the possibility of multiple equilibria
exists with at least two very different inflation rates generating the same inflation tax. In this case, the economy may jump from one
inflation rate to the other.E. The Costs of Adjustment
The last section has suggested that the expected reaction of the economy to a negative oil shock is crucially
dependent on two aspects. First, the nature of the exchange rate regime; second, the fiscal reaction to the shock.
Fortunately, the Venezuelan experience is able to highlight some of these elements as the period that will be
analyzed covers all three exchange regimes and all types of fiscal reaction. Nevertheless, it will be important to
address the issue of how efficient was the adjustment process. In order to do this we shall distinguish between
three concepts of adjustment costst13.
Primary adjustment cost is the optimal and unavoidable decline in absorption required to return to general
equilibrium. If all domestic output were perfectly traceable then primary costs would simply equal the external
shock minus whatever excess of income over absorption which existed at the moment of the shock. However,
since not all output is perfectly traceable, part of the fall in absorption may not go to improve the trade balance
but to reduce non-traceable output. In this case, the economy does not remain at full employment, output falls
below trend generating a further cut in absorption. We refer to this additional effect as secondary adjustment cost.
Finally, we should distinguish these two costs from the actual adjustment costs paid each year, which may be above
or below the sum of the two previous effects depending on whether the economy has over- or under-adjusted,
leaving an unwarranted surplus or deficit. We will measure these costs in Tables 14 and 25.
III.      In Some background on Venezuela
In this section we present a brief historical account of macroeconomic and oil related events in
Venezuela. A synopsis is presented in Table 2.
A.  The origins and development of oil in Venezuela
Venezuela became a major oil exporter in the 1920's. Important discoveries were made during the
1910's and major investments by Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey caused output to boom
through the next decade. By 1925, oil became the country's principal export and in 1929 Venezuela became the
first oil exporter in the world.
Up to that time, coffee and cocoa were the two major export crops. However, the clutch disease impact
of the oil boom in the 1920' s and the Great Depression in the 1930's combined to reduce drastically their
importance. Labor moved massively from the countryside to the campos petroleros, to the main cities or to work
in road and infrastructure construction14.
13 Our framework elaborates on Corden (1988) and Meller (1990) .
14 This period is analyzed in Hausmann (1981), Baptista (1990).After the major boom of the 20's, developments in thirties took a much slower pace both in terms of
oil expansion and fiscal expenditures. The collapse in crop prices and the decision of the government in 1937
to maintain fixed its gold exchange rate when the U.S. decided to devalue -a move that generated a major real
appreciation- further induced resources to move out of traditional uses and into the new oil-fueled development.
In the early 40's, the regulatory framework of the oil industry was redefined through clearer and longer
term contracts. Most oil concessions were renewed for a period of 40 years and fiscal participation in the
revenues was increased through royalties and an income tax. From 1943 up to 1957, this produced a major
expansion of the industry, with output rising by almost 10 percent per year and real prices generally increasing.
The non-oil economy boomed throughout this period at an average yearly rate of 9 percent.
B.      Venezuela's first oil-induced balance of payments crisis
The 1956-1964 period is of interest in that it constituted the first boom-bust cycle in Venezuelan oil
history, with a temporary boom leading to a balance of payments crisist15. The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956
generated an increase in the price of Venezuelan oil and heightened the interest of oil companies in Venezuela.
The military government which controlled the country at the time decided to expand the area under concession
by selling leases on oil fields which were well known to have major reserves. These sales generated almost 2
billion dollars in 1956-57 and helped maintain the huge fiscal expansion. Real public spending tripled between
1950 and 1957.
In January 1958 the military dictatorship was deposed and a democratic regime was put in place with
an American-style Presidency and Congress. Elections were held in December 1958 and were won by the social
democratic Acción Democrática party. Nationalist sentiment against the oil multinationals ran very high and led
to important changes in legislation. No more leases were granted, tax rates were increased and a state-owned
oil company was promoted. The reopening of the Suez Canal, the fall in international oil prices, the loss of
revenue from the suspension of lease sales and the deteriorating oil investment climate produced an important
fall in exports, fiscal revenues and capital inflows. The government was late to react to this situation, with
spending still rising in 1958 and 1959. By 1960, an attack on the currency forced the adoption of an adjustment
package.
The new policy was based on a multiple exchange rate regime, a fiscal contraction and a protectionist
trade policy. By early 1964, the adjustment was completed with a return to a single fixed convertible currency
after a 35 percent cumulative devaluation. Interestingly, throughout the adjustment, GDP grew at an average
rate of 6 percent with the expansion in traceable output compensating for an important contraction in
construction.
C.       From the tranquil sixties to the shocks of the seventies
The sixties were characterized by stagnant oil revenues but growth of 6.5 percent was maintained
15 An analysis of this period can be found in Hausmann (199Ob. Chanter 8).through the impulse of import substitution industrialization. However, as the decade ended the growth rate
started to fall reaching 4.5 percent in 1968-69.
The traditional policy regime prior to the oil shocks of the seventies can be characterized by four major
principles: a fixed and unified exchange rate, fixed and rather rigid interest rates, fiscal discipline and
protectionist trade policy16. This regime appeared to guarantee high growth and a very low inflation rate (1.9
percent for the period 1950-1970). Fiscal balance implied that the exchange rate was viable and interest rates
were fixed above world levels, thus securing demand for the instruments offered by the rapidly expanding
financial system.
When the first oil shock appeared in 1973, policy discussions dealt almost exclusively with the issue of
what to do with the additional fiscal resources. The newly elected government of Carlos Andrés Pérez17 initially
decided to sterilize the windfall revenue abroad "until profitable investments appeared locally". However as the
five-year presidency progressed, expenditures, mainly on public sector companies, rose very quickly and oil
revenues declined so that fiscal balance was reached in 1976 and a deficit of 14 percent of GDP developed by
1978. Growth initially accelerated to over 10 percent in 1975 and then began to fall reaching 3.5 percent in 1978,
as shortages of labor and infrastructure became dominant18.
D. From positive to negative shocks: the treacherous eighties
16  Venezuelan policy in this period has been analyzed by Baptista (1990), Hausmann (199Ob Chapter 10).
17 Presidential elections take place in Venezuela in early December every five years. The ne government takes office in the
first quarter of the following year. The reader should keep in mind the recurring coincidence of the political and economic cycles: 1979,
1984 and 1989 are years in which newly elected goverrnents take over and also periods in which stabilization programs are adopted.
18  On the impact of the oil windfall see Pazos (1979), Rodriguez (1987), Bourgrugnon and Gelb (1989) and Hausmann
(199Ob, Chapter 5).By early 1979, the newly elected government faced a rapidly falling reserve level, an exploding foreign
debt19 and repressed inflation due to severe overheating. It did not foresee the second oil shock which occurred
just a few months later. It adopted a policy of fiscal cutbacks, mainly on imported goods and it freed most
prices20. The economy went into a recession led by a contraction in the construction sector and by a fall in
importable output due to the rapidly appreciating real exchange rate, caused by the gradual return of the over-
heated economy to its natural rate of unemployment through a rise in real wages. Moreover, political difficulties
in adjusting the controlled local interest rates to the jump in international rates led to some capital outflows.
19  It is interesting to note that on his inaugural address in 1979, President Luis Herrera Carnpins announced that he was
receiving an over-indebted country and named a commission to study the problem and propose solutions. As a consequence of this
initative the Public Credit Organic Law was made stricter in 1981 and short-term debt of decentralized agencies was restructured. However,
this did not stop the fall into the debt crisis which would hit Venezuela in 1983. On this period see Palrna (1985), Rodríguez (1987a),
Hausmann (199Ob).
20  Even though total public sector spending increased by only 0.5 percent in 1979-80, expenditureson non-tradeables
rose by 5.1 percent while those on tradeables fell by 11.1 percent. Consequently, the policy alleviated the balance of payments more
than it did the internal imbalance.
After two years of spending cutbacks (1979-80) and given the apparently permanent character of the
second positive oil shock, the government decided to adopt in 1981 an expansionary fiscal policy based on a
projected increase in oil revenues of 12 percent per year. As the policy got under way, the first negative shock
of the eighties appeared generating current account and fiscal deficits, accompanied by a massive attack on the
currency by 1982. In February 1983, after a loss of more than 10 billion dollars in international reserves, the
Central Bank decided to abandon the traditional unified and fixed exchange rate system and to adopt multiple
rates. Capital account transaction were left to a floating exchange market which depreciated by almost 300
percent in the fallowing six months. Fiscal policy turned contractionary and trade policy became more
protectionist as the government attempted to reproduce the 1960 adjustment plan.
By 1984-85 the balance of payments and fiscal accounts were showing impressive surpluses,
unemployment had doubled and inflation had remained surprisingly low, prompting the government to adopt
an expansionary fiscal policy for 1986. Again, just as the policy got under way, the second oil shock took place
almost halving oil exports. In 1986-88, the government attempted to maintain its expansionary policy with
increasing difficulty. During 1986, lack of fiscal restraint caused the foreign exchange premium to explode,
forcing the government to make a "credible" devaluation of the official rate (93 percent in December 1986).
However, since fiscal policy remained expansionary, the premium increased again and reached unsustainable
levels by 1988. Throughout, international reserves were plummeting. Given that elections were scheduled for
December 1988, the policy was maintained in spite of the deteriorating macroeconomic balance, until the new
government took over in February 1989. By that time, little could be done to avoid an explosion of the
underlying tensions and the economy went into its worst recession ever with a major jump in the price level as
the government decided to unify the exchange rate through a floating arrangement.IV.  The nature of the shocks
In this section we analyze the nature of the negative shocks of the eighties and argue that they were
permanent in nature. We further claim that they were exclusive, in the sense that they were fundamentally
inconsistent with prior anticipations and revised in that they led to a major change in income expectations. The
reasons for this being the case for oil and not for other commodities is addressed.
A. Expectations and realizations
Oil projections are made regularly in Venezuela for planning and budgetary purposes by the national
petroleum company PDVSA (pronounced PeDeVeSa) and are revised by the Ministries of Energy and Finance.
Since they affect major political decisions, these projections are the object of intense scrutiny and bickering
between government agencies, political parties and the press. Hence, they must obey a legitimacy constraint
which usually implies adopting some sort of international standard: expectations must be consistent with the
conventional wisdom in the world oil market. In this section we present data produced for the medium-term
plans and the yearly national budgets. The VI medium term National Plan covering the period 19811985 was
presented in September 1981 while the VII Plan, covering 1984-1988 was made public in November 1984.
Table 3 contrasts the projected oil exports of the VI Plan with the actual values. Notice that a stable
increase was expected instead of the marked decline observed. The difference represents 40.4 percent of
expected income in 1983 and 54.3 percent in 1985. Moreover, exports never returned to forecasted levels. Since
all the resources available had been assigned by the Plan, which also included some borrowing, the shortfall was
bound to make fiscal policy unsustainable.
The VII National Plan was written after the dramatic forecasting error of its predecessor which was
severely criticized for the inadequacy of its planning techniques (Matus, 1985). Consequently, the government
decided to allow for contingencies by presenting three scenarios of oil exports. Table 4 shows the data for the
planning period 1985-1988 and compares it with actual developments. Again, we notice that real income was
about 40 percent below the levels expected by the worst scenario. Furthermore, income never returned to the
projected trend. Notice also that in every projection, exports are expected to rise smoothly in value. This is
consistent with Hotelling's rule, since otherwise it would be profitable for suppliers with different expectations
to change their desired level of output.
Table 5 shows yearly projections for Venezuelan oil exports. The projected data, presented in column
1, is taken from the yearly budget laws approved by Congress in the last quarter of each year. These numbers
are also based on projections made by PDVSA and approved by the Ministry of Energy and by the Presidential
Budget Office. They are used to estimate oil tax revenues which averaged around 60 percent of central
government current income during this period. Column 2 shows the actual value of exports. Column 3 calculates
the percentage difference between the first two columns. Column 4 computes the implied rate of growth
between the actual value of exports of the present year and the predicted value for the next year. Column 5
indicates the difference between the actual rate of growth and the predicted rate of growth.
As can be seen, predicted exports tend to be similar and on average somewhat higher than actual
exports of the previous year. This is indicated by the positive average expected growth and by the low standard
deviation for the series as a whole. Part of the deviations can be explained by the fact that the informationavailable in the fourth quarter of the year may differ from the yearly average. This is particularly important for
the two years where the predicted growth was highest (1979 and 1986). In 1979, the oil shock took place in
September-October and thus affected estimates for the following year. In July 1986 OPEC reacted strongly to
the sharp fall in prices, so that by October, prices were well above the low levels reached in May-July. Thus it
appears as if each year, or more specifically, each month of October, becomes the basis of the following years
estimate. This is what you would expect if the underlying stochastic process was a Martingale instead of trend
stationary.
As is well known, in Maringales all shocks are interpreted as permanent since the current price becomes
the best estimate of future prices thus leading to a full revision of expectations. If the process was trend
stationary, today's price rise (above a certain level) would imply expectations of a decline in next year's price. So,
part of the instability in the series would be predicted. However, this does not happen in Table 5 as can be seen
by boticing that the level and growth rate prediction errors of the series (columns 3 and 5 ) have similar standard
deviations.
Moreover, the data clearly show that the three shocks which took place between 1978 and 1989 were
not predicted and that they were inconsistent with previous expectations and that they caused these expectations
to be altered. In the terminology of Bevan el al (1989) they would qualify as exclusive and revised. Thus, for
instance, exports in 1978 were below predicted levels, and generated a bearish view of the market for the
following year. Thus during the 1979-1980 oil shock, major underprediction errors were made. Notice that
the 1980 predicted level was very similar to the actual 1979 level and 33.2 percent below the actual value.
This induced the agents in the oil markets to revise their expectations upwards and a rapid positive trend
of 12 percent per year became the new conventional wisdom, and was reflected in the VI National Plan21.
However, major over-prediction errors were made in 1981-83, thus indicating that the first negative oil
shock came as a surprise. Nevertheless, after each fall it was expected that prices would remain on their
upward trend, but starting from a lower base.
After 1983, the market seemed to have determined a new much lower plateau and expectations of
more moderate nominal increases became the norm. The oil market, however, surprised everyone again
by falling significantly and causing huge over-prediction errors in 1985 and 1986. Again, each new year's
actual data became the basis for next years prediction, just as in a Martingale.
B. Ex-post interpretations: a brief recount of changing diagnosis
It is interesting to contrast this view of the stochastic process with the arguments used at the time
to justify both expectations and policies. As mentioned above, the VI National Plan announced in
September 1981 projected an increase in the real price of crude oil of 12 percent per year for the planning
period. As the Plan was being printed, the oil market turned bearish. It suddenly became clear that
anticipation of future price rises, linked to the Iran-Irak war had caused heavy speculative accumulation
of inventories during 1979-80. This behavior, more than any other, effectively caused the rise in prices,
which averaged 29.7 dollars per barrel in 1981 for the Venezuelan mix, up from 12.0 dollars per barrel in
1978. As inventories reached a ceiling and interest rates increased to the highest levels ever, the market
weakened dramatically.
21 If the process was trend stationary the prediction would have implied a price fall.After this event took place, four aspects changed the medium term outlook in the opinion of
experts22. First, it was argued that the price elasticity of demand, which had remained very low after the
1973 shock, increased significantly as thermo-electric plants switched quickly to coal and gas. Secondly,
apparent income elasticity of demand fell dramatically and experts associated this fall to the delayed impact
of investments in conservation, prompted by the first oil shock, and to a change in the technological
pattern of world growth. Thirdly, the world entered into the 1981-1982 recession and fourthly, major new
non-OPEC sources of supply had appeared in Mexico and the North Sea.
To contain the fall in prices, OPEC adopted the strategy of output cuts. Mandatory quotas were
fixed on all members who were required to sell at official prices. Saudi Arabia adopted the role of swing
producer adjusting its output in order to defend the agreed price structure. OPEC output, which had
reached 30 million barrels a day in 1980, was reduced almost by half. This strategy meant that the volume
of Venezuelan oil output in 1983 was 29 percent below 1979 levels.
22  Wack (1985) recounts the way in which Royal Dutch Shell interpreted these changes in their
strategic planning process.
Conventional wisdom during 1983-1984 held that as the world economy recovered from the 1981-
82 recession, demand for oil would grow allowing OPEC to progressively relax its control on output. The
experience during 1984 appeared to falta pa 18, 19, 20, 21,22,23,24 justify this optimism as prices
strengthened. Consequently, when the Venezuelan government asked again the oil company in 1984 to
produce new medium term projections for the VII National Plan, PDVSA presented the three scenarios
shown in Table 4 characterized by stable real prices for oil and growing OPEC quotas.However, during 1985 world demand for oil fell and non-OPEC supply increased forcing Saudi
Arabia to cut its output to under 3 million barrels a day in order to defend the price structure. This
appeared as too much of a sacrifice to the Saudi government given that its production potential, which had
been effectively reached in 1980, was still at 10 million barrels a day. Hence it decided to abandon its role
as swing producer in the second semester of 1985 and increased its output to its established "notional"
quota of 4.5 million barrels a day. Soon after, in January 1986, prices crashed causing Venezuelan oil
income to fall to almost half the level projected by the worst scenario provided by the oil industry23.
After the shock, the new conventional wisdom argued that OPEC's strategy during 1981-1985,
which was based on defending prices through quotas, had collapsed because oil had priced itself out of the
energy market and because high cost non-OPEC producers were filling the gap created by the output
cutbacks. The new strategy had to be based on recapturing market share both within the oil market and
in the broader energy market. Consequently, a much lower price level had to be maintained for a sianificant
period of time.
In conclusion, the negative shocks were unpredicted and caused expectations to change in line with
the new information set. A consistent ex-post interpretation of events has always been developed to explain
the new price level and to guide policy. From then on, prices were always expected to rise smoothly, until
the next shock.
Economists may have trouble believing that prices of goods do not revert back to some
fundamental long run cost. In the case of tree crops, this intuition seems to be well founded since long-run
supply curves are likely to be very flat. Large shifts in price may take place because of short-run inelasticities
of supply, but in the longer term the possibility to expand output with mostly constant marginal costs will
act as a strong stabilizer. At any time, cost differences between producers are small. It is the inadequacy
of the tree stock vis-a vis current demand that creates most of the price dynamics.
By contrast, currrent oil output is produced at wildly different long-run marginal costs due to
geological differences between suppliers. This means that supply or demand shifts may require very large
and permanent changes in vice.
23 Not even Saudi Arabia expected this turn of events, as was made clear by the dismissal of the Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki
el-Yamani in November 1986, the architect of Saudi oil strategy.
V.  Some methodological considerations
In this section we present some methodological aspects behind the tables that are analyzed below.
We start with a technique to measure the oil shocks in terms of domestic non-oil GDP and then develop
it further to express domestic adjustment in similar units.
A.  A method to measure the size of the external shocks?The oil sector can be taken to be an enclave with its final demand forming part of public sector
spending and its production requiring only specific factors of production. Exports then resemble an
international transfer, and the relevant GDP indicator is non-oil GDP24. The ratio of oil exports to non-oil
GDP, call it +, can be written as:
                      = (e P* X )/(P Q)                                                               (1)
           where e is the nominal exchange rate, P*is the foreign price of oil, X is the volume of exports, P is
the non-oil GDP deflator and Q is non-oil GDP.
                          For reasons that will become obvious below, it is convenient to multiply and divide
 by a relevant world price index. We shall use the US wholesale price index (WPI):
                      = (e P* X WPI)/(P Q WPI)                                                               (2)
                          The percentage change in      can be decomposed by log differentiation equation 2:
         
                     where the symbol    ^   over a letter indicates the percentage change of the variable.      
                                                                                   
            Reorganizing
the previous
expression we have:
24 Throughout the text, unless otherwise specified, GDP will simply refer to non-oil GDP.
The first term in square brackets of equation 4 measures the relative external shock as a share of GDP.
This term has two components: the absolute external shock, in round brackets, measures the impact
of changes in export volume and real price, while the second one takes account of the fact thatnon-oil GDP changes, thus affecting the denominator of . In an expanding economy, homothetic
growth will require a constant increase in oil revenue so that its relative share remains constant. The relative
external shock measures how much faster or slower than non-oil GDP has real oil revenue been changing.
                   The second term in square brackets of equation 4 takes account of the real depreciation effect
which affects the domestic value of oil exports.  For convenience we divide it into two components: the
underlying depreciation (in round brackets) which consists of the inflation differential, and the change
in the nominal exchange rate.       
                                Figure 2 shows the accumulated changes since 1968 in both the absolute and the
relative external shock2525. As can be seen, the first positive oil shock of the seventies had an initial
absolute magnitude of over 50 percent of GDP. The govertment quickly reacted to it by imposing a major
cut in output in order to conserve the resource. Production in 1975 was 34 percent below its 1973 level and
kept falling slowly thereafter. From 1975 to 1978, the first oil shock represented on average 30 percent of
GDP in absolute terms. However, given the large acceleration in GDP growth, by 1978 its relative size with
respect to the economy had gone back to its pre-shock level.  By contrast, the second oil shock represented
some 20 percentage points of GDP in 198081 with respect to 1978 in absolute terms and a slightly smaller
amount in relative terms due to the stagnation in growth, which occurred in this period.
                                  The size of the first and second negative oil shocks is presented in Tables 6 and 16
and will be analyzed below.
B. A method to measure the macroeconomic adjustment to the shocks
  One way to describe the economy's adjustment to the shock is to start from the national accounting
identities. Nominal GDP must equal aggregate expenditure: 
                          
                    where A is real absorption, PA is the price of absorption and TB is the trade balance. This
expression is only approximately accurate since we have substituted oil GDP by oil exports.
25  Unless otherwise specified, all numbers for the 1968-1984 period come from the CORDIPLAN/ILPES database.
Information for the 1984-1989 period is taken from the National Accounts Statistics for 1989.
             Dividing this expression by nominal non-oil GDP (P Q), log-differentiating and rearranging termswe obtain:
                 
        The term on the left hand side is the relative real external shock. The first term on the right hand side,
which we call the relative absoprtion effect, measures the excess growth of absorption relative to output, as a
share of non-oil GDP. The second term is the shift in the nominal trade balance, also as a share of GDP.
The change in the real or constant-price trade balance is simply the difference between the real relative
external shock and the relative absorption growth. The gap between the current price and the constant
price measure of the trade balance is due to relative price shifts. For instance, a real depreciation will
increase the value of a trade surplus measured in unit non-oil GDP.
      The third term takes into account these relative price effects. It indicates how the much  of  the shock
has been converted into a negative income effect generated by shifts in relative prices.  A real depreciation
has two effects:  it increases the real value of exports and of imports.  We call the first effect the real
depreciation effect.  We call the second one the relative absorption price effect, which indirectly measures the impact
of the devaluation on imports since these exlplain the difference between the price of absorption and the
price of non-oil GDP.  In general terms, a negative shock is transformed either into reduced relative
absorption, a deteriorated nominal trade balance or a change in relative prices.
        Using this approach, data for the shocks are presented in Tables  7 and 17.  The real relative
absorption effect is further decomposed in Tables 9 and 21.  Savings and investment by agents are
presented in Tables 8 and 18.  Changes in relative prices are studied in Tables 13 and Error!  Bookmark
not defined..  The impact of real depreciation on the domestic value of the oil surplus is estimated in
Tables 10 and 19.  Transfers of resources to the public sector through real depreciation, exchange profits
and seniorage are studied in Tables 11 and 20.  Changes in output are analyzed in Tables 12 and 23. 
Relative prices are presented in Tables 13 and Error!  Bookmark not defined..  The overall efficiency of
adjustment is estimated in Tables 14 and 25.
VI.  The analysis of the first negative shock 1982-1985
        In this section we analyze the first negative oil shock.  We will start by studying the medium term
changes.  Then we will turn to the study of the adjustment path distinguishing between the period of non-
adjustment (1982), the initial reaction to the regime collapse (1983) and the further adjustment effort (1984-
85).A.  Medium term adjustment 1981-1985
        Compared to the levels reached by the oil income in 1981, the real relative external shock amounted
to 14.1 percent of non-oil GDP by 1985 (Table 6).  Aggregate adjustment took mainly the form of a cut
in real absorption which fell 22.6 percent of GDP more than output (Table 7) determining a substantial
improvement in the real trade balance.
        Decomposing the real relative absorption effect (Table 9) we notice that the cut in spending affected
mainly investment (12.5 percent) but also private consumption (3.7 percent).  Public consumption was
barely cut (0.9 percent).  It also affected mainly tradeables which fell by 19.9 percent of GDP while private
non-tradeables declined by only 4.7 percent, indicating strong demand shifts.
      From the viewpoint of the savings and investment balance (Table 8), the cut in absorption took
mainly the form of a decline in the gross fixed investment rate which dropped by 12.5 percentage points
of GDP, in line with domestic savings (11.1 percent of GDP). Accordingly, neither inventories nor foreign
savings played a major role in the process26. Most of the savings and investment cuts between 1981 and
1985 were public (8.2 percent and 12.4 percent respectively), while little change took place in private rates
(2.9 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively), which is is consistent with our previous finding that most of the
consumption cut was private.
26 This conclusion is only valid when comparing the two end points 1981 and 1985. In the process of adjustment both
foreign savings and inventories play a major role.      Even though the external shock had only a direct impact on the public sector given that the oil
industry was fully nationalized, there were significant income transfers during this period. By devaluing the
real exchange rate, the public sector's external surplus increases in domestic value causing a transfer of real
income from the private sector. Depending on the exchange rate given to the oil industry relative to other
rates, this effect may appear either as an increase in the operating surplus of PDVSA or as exchange proSts
at the Central Bank. Tables 10 and 11 calculate these effects and show that they amounted to 6.3
percentage points of GDP27. In addition, in 1985 the public sector was able to appropriate 2.3 percentage
points of GDP through seniorage 28. These income transfers explain in part the decline in private
consumption.
       In respect to output29(Table 12), the tradeable sector grew much more than non-tradeables.  In fact,
between 1982 and 1984 private non-tradeables showed a negative growth rate while tradeables only
declined in 1983.  In 1985 tradeables grew at more than double the rate of non-tradeables, explaining more
than half of the aggregate growth.
    This result is in line with the movements in relative prices (Table 13). There was a real depreciation after
1982 both measured as the relative price of tradeables with respect to non-tradeables and as the IMF
definition of the real exchange rate. This change in relative prices is also consistent with the shift in demand
from tradeables towards non-tradeables.
     A major construction bust took place throughout the period as can be seen from the fact that demand
for non-traded capital goods declined by 9.4 percent of GDP more than output (Table 9) between 1981
and 1985. Moreover, as shown in Table 12, the construction sector declined every year between 1981 and
1985, falling by a cumulative 76 percent. In addition, the relative price of construction with respect to total
nontraded goods declined (Table 13).
     The efficiency of adjustment is analyzed in Table 14. To do so, we compare the actual values to a
counter-factual in which the economy exhibits homothetic growth of 3 percent per year, including its real
oil revenue. We chose a low growth rate because the economy was very close to full employment in 1981
and productivity trends had been negative. Anyway, a more optimistic counter-factual would only make
the adjustment more inefficient.
     Table 14-shows the results of our calculation. The first row measures the external oil shock with
respect to its 3 percent growth trend, in units of trend non-oil GDP. The second row deducts from the
external shock an amount equal to the initial output absorption gap (i.e. the excess current account surplus),
27 The real depreciation effect of Table 6 captures this same phenomenon since it corresponds to
the change in the relative price of oil income in terms of domestic output. It estimates it at 5 percentage points of GDP.
28 Given the multiple exchange rate system in place, seniorage could be increased but at the
cost of a rise in the foreign exchange premium. In December 1985 the premium was 96 percent (see
Table 1).
29Notice that Table 12 presents the sectoral growth rates weighted by the share of each sector in total non-oil output.  It
represents the contribution of each sector to the aggregate growth rate.  Since the tradeable sector is less than half the size of the non-
tradeable sector, the same contribution implies a much higher growth rate.which we take to be equal to 2 percentage points of GDP in 1981. This row indicates the unavoidable
disabsorption costs of the shock.
      The third row shows the difference between actual non-oil GDP and trend GDP in units of trend
GDP. This represents the loss of potential output given the path taken by the economy and we call it
secondary adjustment costs. In an optimal adjustment process, these would be avoided. The sum of primary
and secondary adjustment costs are called total adjustment costs.
       In the fifth row we indicate how much actual absorption differed from the 3 percent trend, measured
in units of trend GDP. The final row indicates the difference between total adjustment costs and the actual
adjustment which took place. If the difference is positive, then there is excess adjustment expressed in
terms of an excessive balance of payments surplus. If the difference is negative, then the economy is
reducing its net foreign assets in order to finance absorption, and has consequently adjusted insufficiently.
       By 1985 the economy had incurred adjustment costs of 28.2 percent of GDP, composed of 15.4
percent in primary absorption costs, 11.1 percent of secondary adjustment costs and 3.7 percent of excess
adjustment. The secondary adjustment costs are broadly consistent with Okun's Law given the rise in the
unemployment rate of 6.0 percent (Table 1).
        Let us summarize our findings. An external shock of 14.1 percent of GDP was adjusted by means
of a fall in absorption and a real depreciation. The composition of absorption shifted towards non-
tradeables while that of output towards tradeables. All these findings are in line with the (negative) clutch
disease effect.
         Moreover, a major construction bust took place with a significant drop in demand for non-traded
capital goods and a decline in its relative price. This bust occurred in the context of a negative permanent
shock.
B. 1982: The private reaction to public non-adjustment
        The relatively standard results obtained in the previous section for the medium term adjustment
contrast markedly with the initial path taken by the economy. In 1982 there was a real relative negative
shock of 8.9 percent of GDP (Table 6). Instead of adjusting through a reduction in relative absorption and
a real depreciation, the economy increased absorption by 1.2 percent more than output and appreciated
the real exchange rate30. The trade balance, as a result, deteriorated by 12.3 percent of GDP (Table 7).
Domestic savings fell by 9.7 percent of GDP.  Furthermore, real appreciation produced a negative oil
exchange taz of 1.6 percent (Table 11) due to the decline in the domestic value of oil output, thius
deterioring further the public sector accounts.
   This clear pattern of non-adjustment was to give significant signals to the private sector.   The
expectation that the policy regime would have to be reformed and that changes would include a nominal
devaluation, (i.e. a default on the real value of money and other government liabilities) caused the private
30 The relative price of tradeables declined 4.2 percent while the IMF style real exchange rate
appreciated 10.9 percent (Table 13).sector to react through three channels: capital flight, inventroy accumulation of tradeable goods (imports)
and a reduccion in the purchase of non-tradeable goods (imports) and a reduction in the purchase of non-
tradeable capital goods.
                                              In effect, as shown in Table 5 capital flight, defined as privte non-financial
short-term capital outflows plus errors and omissions reached 6.5 billion dollars which explain most of the
8.2 billion dollars in international reserve losses.  These were financed only in a small proportion by a
reduction in base money (756 million dollars).  Most of the resources came through an increase in the
private flow of financial savings generaed by a cut in demand for fixed investment.  Private gross fixed
capital formation decline by 3.6 percent of GDP (Table 8), a fall of 23.6 percent in its own terms.  In fact,
aggregate fixed investment fell, thwarting the expansionary designs of government policy.
      There was a also positive inventory swing equal to 3.2 percent of GDP (Table 9).  In fact, all of the
increase in absorption is ecplained by inventories (consumption and fixed investment fell by 2 percentage
points of GDP).  Furthermore, all of the increase in absorption wa in tradeables, since non-tradeables
declined by 0.5 percent.
          Hence private behavior can be explained as an anticipated response to regime collapse becaus of
insufficient fiscal adjustment to the shock.  The construction bust, on the other hand, was not the
consequence of a decline in absorption but of a change in the pattern of private asset accumulation.
C. 1983: the reaction to the balance of payments collapse
       In 1983, the year of the balance of payments crisis, there was a further deterioration of real relative oil
income (2.4 percent of GDP).  However, the real trade balance showed a positive swing (25.1 percent)
through a major decline in absorption (27.8 percent, Table 7).  In nominal terms, the swing in foreign
savings amounted to 13.5 percentage points of GDP (Table 8).   How did such a drastic cut in absorption
take place?
        More remarkably, this drop in absorption happened in spite of a fall in aggregate savings of 8.6
percent of GDP. Thus, the whole adjustment took the form of a fall in total investment: 10.8 percent in
fixed capital formation and 13.5 percent in inventories. Decomposing the real relative absorption effect
we notice that the decline in consumption, investment and inventories amounted to 3.9 percent, 7.3 percent
and 19.2 percent, respectively. Hence, inventories explain the bulk of the adjustment. Also, demand for
tradeables fell by 25.7 percent more than GDP compared to the 1.1 percent decline for non-tradeables.
       In this occasion, the drop in savings was mainly private (8.9 percent of GDP). This can be explained
by the sudden shift of resources to the public sector through the real depreciation and seniorage
mechanisms described in Table 11, a swing of 7.9 percent of GDP.
       Seniorage was possible because the abandonement of the fixed exchange rate regime eliminated the
Central Bank's obligation to sell its foreign reserves at a fixed price. By renouncing to this comitment it was
possible to increase domestic credit to the public sector without the offsetting effect of a decline in
reserves. In fact, as the private sector tried to convert its excess holdings of money into foreign assets, theexchange rate in the parallel market depreciated by 223 percent between February 18 1983 (the day of the
balance of payments collapse) and December 31 of that same year.
                                                  This depreciation implied a 3.5 billion dollar decline in the value of the
money base (Table 15). Furthermore, since the nominal supply of base money was allowed to increase
rapidly, the government was able to appropriate a further 940 million dollars through seniorage. It is these
sorts of default costs that agents were trying to avoid.
         As mentioned above, the decline in absorption of 27.8 percent fell disproportionately on tradeables
(26.7 percent). This explains not only the drastic improvement in the trade balance but also the relatively
moderate recession: non-oil GDP fell "only" by 3.7 percent. However this swing in the composition of
demand happened in spite of small and contradictory changes in relative prices. As Table 13 shows, the
real exchange rate (IMF definition) depreciated scarcely by 3.4 percent while the relative price of tradeables
appreciated 4.2 percent.
           Hence there are two questions to be addressed. First, why did the composition of demand change
so drastically without a large shift in relative price? Secondly, why did the relative domestic price of
tradeables not increase in spite of a nominal exchange rate depreciation and a large increase in the level of
implicit protection?
     The following interpretation is advanced. Assume inventories depreciate because of perishability or
other reasons. This implies that the stocks accumulated in 1982 had to be consumed in 1983. Hence, in
spite of a 50 percent drop in imports, the decline in demand and the dishoarding of stocks created
effectively an excess domestic supply of tradeables. This forced down their relative price. The new
protective system set up with the adoption of multiple exchange rates, therefore, was not a binding
constraint for most goods during 1983. In fact, the volume of dishoarding was such that demand for
domestically produced importables fell, explaining the decline in the output of tradeables (Table 12).
       Summing up, in 1983 the balance of payments crisis was followed by a mayor improvement in the
trade balance which was not generated by a rise in savings but mainly by a massive decline in inventories
and, to a lesser degree, in investment. The adoption of multiple rates implied that the goverment defaulted
on the dollar value of its monetary liabilities with the private sector, by 3.5 billion dollars. Moreover, under
this exchange regime the government could use seniorage to finance its deficit. In addition, exchange
profits further increased the transfer of real resources to the public sector. Consequently, the cut in
spending was mostly private. Given the previous accumulation of inventories, the decline in absorption was
highly concentrated in tradeables, thus explaining the large improvement in the trade balance without a
major
decline in output.
D. 1984-1985: longer lasting adjustment.
         Inventory change is not a durable form of demand reduction since it is limited by a non-negativity
constraint on stocks. Hence, the balance of trade improvement of 1983 was unsustainable. Other
adjustments to absorption were needed in 1984 since the inventory effect would now provide an important
demand push. Moreover, the reliance on seniorage as a major source of public finance would lead to an
even larger exchange premium. In February 1984, one year after the balance of payments crisis, the newlyelected government adopted additional and more lasting adjustment measures consisting mainly of an
further devaluation and a major cut in public spending. They were to generate a relatively smooth aggregate
transition but with major changes in its composition.
         There was a 10 percent jump in the aggregate savings rate (Table 8), due mainly to internal reasons
since the oil picture showed only a very slight improvement (1.5 percent of GDP, Table 6). Savings were
used mainly to finance the now positive swing in inventories of 11 percent of GDP, caused by the end of
dishoarding.   Fixed investment declined in real relative terms by 4 percentage points of GDP (Table 9).
The nominal trade balance as a share of GDP actually improved, but this was mostly due to relative price
effects31, since real absorption increased.
        The rise in savings was mainly a private phenomenon (7.2 percent), but public savings increased also
(2.7 percent), due to the improvement in oil income, the transfer of resources through depreciation (see
Table 11) and a cut in consumption (0.5 percent of GDP). However, most of the amelioration in the fiscal
deficit came from a decline in investment (9.8 percent of GDP or 41.5 percent in its own terms). This
improvement led to a stop in the use of seniorage, allowing the parallel rate to stabilize in nominal terms
and the premium to fall. It is in these circumstances that the increase in private savings, the end of capital
flight and the recovery of private investment must be understood.
           In fact, fixed private investment increased by 8.1 percent of GDP of 47.6 percent in their own
terms, but remained still 13 percent below their already low 1982 levels. Moreover, since aggregate
investment fell, there was a further decline in nontraded capital goods output and relative price (Tables 12
and 13), confirming the durability of the construction bust.
         With the end of dishoarding and the additional nominal devaluation, there was a real depreciation
and a rise in the relative price of tradeables as would be expected under the adjustment to a permanent
negative shock. Resources shifted towards the production of tradeables, but so did demand, given the
inventory swing.
        The situation was to remain very similar in 1985, except that a negative oil shock was allowed to
reduce public savings and the trade balance, without much internal impact. By then, the fiscal and external
accounts were in surplus, inflation was at 9.1 percent and unemployment had risen to 12.1 percent. A
confident look at the future convinced the government that stability had been achieved and that there was
room for growth through additional public investment. However, the second oil shock was to change
matters dramatically.
VII. The analysis of the second negative oil shock 1986-1989
31 Real depreciation increased the value of the trade surplus measured in units of non-oil GDP.          While it took about a year for the balance of payments to collapse after prices declined in 1982, it
took three years for reserves to run out once prices crashed in 1986 This much longer period of non-
adjustment was made possible by the presence of multiple exchange rates32, which limited the volume of
capital flight In fact, while, under fixed exchange rates, in the single year of 1982 reserve losses amounted
to 8.2 billion dollars, mostly through capital outflows, in the multiple exchange rate interval of 1986-1988
the loss reached even higher figures (9.6 billion), but spread out in a much longer period and linked mostly
to current account deficits (see Tables 15 and 26). The balance of payments finally collapsed in 1989, the
last year for which we have a full set of accounts. As in 1983, however, a sustainable adjustment was not
achieved since the inventory cycle had not yet played itself out. Hence the analysis will lack an adequate
epilogue.
A. 1986-1988: a long period of non-adjustment
        Real relative oil income declined by a cumulative 13.4 percent in the period 1986-1988 (Table 16).
At the macroeconomic level, most of the adjustment took place through a deterioration of the nominal
trade balance of 11.9 percent (Table 17). Real absorption grew less than output in 1986, but this trend was
reversed from 1987 onwards so that by 1988 it had expanded in line with non-oil GDP. In other words,
internal demand had not adjusted to the shock.
      At the aggregate level, savings in 1988 were only 4.5 percent of GDP below their 1985 levels (Table
18), while fixed investment actually increased by 5.2 percent so that foreign savings declined by 13.1
percent of GDP. Again, we notice a significant accumulation of inventories in the period prior to the
balance of payments collapse.
      These aggregate figures hide very different behaviour by the public and private sectors. Savings
declined by 8.7 percent of GDP in the public sector while they increased 4.2 percent in the private sector.
Public investment increased by 3.4 percent of GDP indicating a complete absence of fiscal adjustment.
       Confronted by this absence of response, the private sector deduced that the situation could not be
maintained, meaning that when fiscal adjustment would eventually take place, private income would fall.
Consequently, current income was thought to be above sustainable levels warranting an increase in savings,
instead of the decline that would be expected under a negative shock.
32As mentioned in section II.C., models such as Park and Sachs (1987) predict that the balance of payments crisis will take
longer to occur under multiple exchange rates.
                                                    In fact, the lack of fiscal response became evident already in 1986 when
public savings declined by 6.9 percent, and investment increased by 2.1 percent, causing a major
deterioration in the fiscal and external account. The private sector attempted to convert its portfolio into
foreign assets, which, given the presence of multiple exchange rates, generated a 71 percent depreciation
of the parallel rate between December 1985 and November 1986, causing the dollar value of the monetary
base to fall by 1 billion dollars (Table 26) and the exchange premium to reach 235 percent. This prompted
the December 1986 depreciation of the official exchange rate by 93 percent.       However this devaluation did not have the same fiscal consequences as those of 1983 and 1984. Since
the government's external surplus was now much smaller, the income appropriated through real
depreciation was now smaller. Nevertheless, as indicated in Table 20, in 1987 the oil exchange tax increased
by 2.6 percent of GDP relative to 1986. However, since the government maintained a subsidized rate for
food, medicines and registered debt, much of that rise was returned to the economy through foreign
exchange losses at the Central Bank, leaving a negligible fiscal effect.
         During 1987 and 1988, fiscal policy was clearly expansionary. Public savings fell while investment
increased from 8.6 percent of GDP in 1985 to 12 percent in 1988. This was an important element in
determining private behavior. The representative agent must have interpreted that the absence of fiscal
adjustment to a large oil shock meant that the policy regime was unsustainable.
           Agents tried to move away from domestic currency as can be seen by examining the dollar value
of the money base, which continued to fall in 1987 and 1988, through parallel rate depreciation. Given the
prevailing exchange regime, this did not prevent the government from using seniorage to finance the fiscal
deficit (see Tables 20 and 26)33.
             Again, inventories were a crucial channel through which the private sector could adjust to the
expected collapse. Stock accumulation averaged 5.1 percent of GDP in 1987-1988, indicating an
anticipation of a jump in the price level. Finally, private investment remained high throughout the period
.
      The composition of absorption stayed remarkably stable throughout the 19861988 period (Table 21
22). Output growth accelerated in 1986 because of the public investment expansion while consumption
lagged behind. However, the situation tended to be reversed from 1987 onwards so that by 1988 both
consumption and investment had expanded in line with output.
33The simultaneous presence of positive seniorage and of a fall in the dollar value of base money indicates that the public
did not demand the additional supply of money and tried to convert it into foreign assets.      There are also no significant differences in the composition of absorption between tradeables and
non-tradeables, even though the first increased slightly more than the second, indicating the lack of
adjustment. This result is consistent with the observed decline in the relative price of tradeables vs non-
tradeables throughout the period (Table Error! Bookmark not defined.).   Part of this fall is explained
by the fact that in the December 1986 reform, non-traditional exports, which had previously been assigned
to the parallel exchange rate, were transferred to the new depreciated official rate. This implied a significant
nominal and real appreciation for exports of non-oil tradeables34. However, the real exchange rate (IMF
definition) for imports shows a major depreciation in 1987, as a consequence of the December 1986
devaluation.
        We have already advanced one reason why this shift did not affect the domestic relative price of
tradeables: the new regime appreciated of the exchange rate for nontraditional exports. One more cause
is the fact that under multiple exchange rates and import controls, a devaluation will reduce the implicit
tariff appropriated by importers thus lessening the effect on domestic prices. Partial support to this
explanation comes from analyzing the ratio of the wholesale (domestic) price of imported goods to the
CPI. Since the first is mainly composed of tradeables while the second measures mostly non-tradeables,
this relative price is a proxi for the real exchange rate at domestic prices. As can be seen in Table Error!
Bookmark not defined., this ratio increases much less in 1987 than the IMF definition and falls much
faster in 1988, indicating that the December 1986 devaluation did not increase significantly the relative
price of importables. Hence, since it reduced the relative price of non-oil exportables and did not increase
significantly the domestic price of importables, the overall impact on tradeables (importables plus non-oil
exportables) was negative.
      In spite of the negative oil shock, there was no construction bust in the nonadjustment period 1986-
1988. The construction sector averaged a rate of growth of 5.2 percent over the period, in line with the rise
of GDP. Its relative price remained fairly stable. This result contrasts with that observed in 1982, when the
government also tried to prop up the economy through public investment, but the decline in private
investment declined by more, leaving an important aggregate slump in construction. In 1982, the reaction
of the private sector was geared to increase its financial savings and transform it into capital flight.
However, in 1986-1988 the presence of multiple exchange rates left private agents with real goods as the
only hedges against the eventual jump in the price level. In this context, construction competed with
inventories as a store of value35.
        Also, the presence of the multiple exchange rate regime affected the nature of the inventory build-up.
If a devaluation is expected and capital flight is limited, then the best investment is to buy imports, given
that their domestic price will rise in line with the depreciation. However, since agents were unable to satisfy
their demand for foreign goods given quantitative restrictions on imports, they accumulated any storable
domestic good. This shows up in Table 22 as a strong demand for domestically produced tradeables.
34At the time of the December 1986 devaluation the parallel rate had reached 25.2 Bs./US$, while the new official rate was
devalued from 7.5 to 14.5 Bs./US$.
35One could venture the hipothesis that real estate vis a vis inventories, has a lower correlation with the exchange rate but a
smaller rate of depreciation (perishability).  Hence, as the date of the collapse nears, there should be a declining emphasis in
construction and a hightened demand for inventories.  This trend appears to be present in Tables 18 and Error!  Bookmark not
defined..        Hence, the flight out of money had an expansionary impact on demand for domestic goods which,
given the prevailing high rates of unemployment left by the adjustment to the first shock, generated an
important expansion in output. As shown in Table 23, GDP grew at rates in excess of 5 percent throughout
the period. As a consequence of this growth, the unemployment rate fell by 5.2 percentage points between
the end of 1985 and 1988.
        To analyze the efficiency of adjustment, we assume a counterfactual in which output, absorption and
real external oil income follow a 4 percent homothetic growth36. We also assume an initial output
absorption gap of 2 percentage points of GDP given the size of the current account surplus in 1985.
       Table 25 shows that by 1988, primary absorption costs were 11.3 percentage points of trend non-oil
GDP. Interestingly, secondary adjustment costs were negative, as the economy grew at rates higher than
4 percent. Hence, total adjustment costs were only 5.5 percent of trend GDP by 1988. However, since
absorption grew more than in the counterfactual, actual adjustment costs were negative. This meant that
by 1988 the adjustment was insufficient by the amount of the primary absorption costs. Excess growth in
output compensated for excess expansion of absorption. Consequently, contrary to the first shock, non-
adjustment did not have output costs.
B. 1989: the balance of payments collapse
               
       As in 1983, when the balance of payments finally collapsed, drastic improvements did take place in
the current account through a major fall in absorption. As shown in Table 16, there was a 2.3 percent
improvement in the absolute real external shock (3.6 percent in relative terms given the decline in output
of 9.7 percent). Absorption fell by 19 percent in real terms, i.e. 10.4 percent more than output (Table 17).
This meant that the real trade balance improved by 14.4 percent of GDP. However, the improvement in
the nominal trade balance was much greater given the important real depreciation which took place when
the exchange rate was unified in March 1989.
      The improvement in the trade balance can be accounted for by a rise in savings (7.8 percent), a fall
in fixed investment (3.7 percent) and a major swing in inventories (11.3 percent, see Table 18). The rise in
savings was exclusively due to the public sector (7.8 percent) since private savings actually fell (S.1 percent).
Furthermore, most of the investment cut also took place in the private sector (3.6 percent)37.
36The fact that unemployment was higher in 1985 than in 1981 leads us to assume a slightly higher counterfactual growth rate.
37These numbers refer to savings and investment rates as they appear in Table 18.  In real terms, i.e., nost including changes
in relative prices or in GDP, public and private investment fell by 2.4 and 4.7 percent of GDP, respectively.  See Table 21.       The jump in public sector savings is explained mainly by the 10.2 percent increase in the oil exchange
tax (Tables 19 and 20), caused by devaluation38. Faced with such a drastic reduction in income, the private
sector reduced both savings and consumption, each by an amount equal to 5.1 percent of GDP. Moreover,
investment and inventories were cut by 4.7 and 10.1 percent respectively, leaving a total decline in private
absorption of 18.9 percent compared to only 2.4 percent for the public sector (Table 21).
     The decline in private absorption exceeded the fall in income generating an increase in financial
savings. These resources were used by the private sector to purchase base money39 (2.2 percent of GDP
or 636 million dollars, see Tables 20 and 26) and to cancel import letters of credit for 3.3 billion dollars40.
         The decline in absorption fell mostly on tradeables (14 percent of GDP) but also affected non-
tradeables (5.4 percent). Within tradeables, it fell by 7.8 percent on imports and 6.2 percent on domestic
goods. Within non-tradeables, it fell by 1.7 percent in consumer goods and by 3.7 percent in investment
goods, indicating the presence of a major construction bust. These figures contrast with those of 1983.
Then, the drop in absorption of non-tradeables was marginal and the fall in tradeables was mostly
concentrated on imports. Hence, in 1989 the much larger downturn in domestic demand caused a much
greater fall in GDP (9.7 percent). As Table 23 shows, the decline was evenly split between tradeables, non-
traceable consumer goods and construction41.
       The drop in traceable output took place in spite of a major real depreciation. The IMF-style real
38Part of this increase had to be transferred abroad through the increase in the value of debt service measured in units of
domestic non-oil GDP.  Notice that exchange subsidies remained stable at around 2 percent of GDP.  Another contributing factor to
the increase in public savings was the rise in oil income.
39As shown in Table 26, in 1989, for the first time since the start of the second oil shock, seniorage was not accompanied by
a decline in the dollar value of the money base, indicating that a good portion of it was actually demanded given the sudden increase in
the price level.
40Under the multiple exchange rate system in place, imports had to be financed for a minimum period of 180 days and were
guaranteed a fixed official rate.  When the balance of payments collapsed in 1989, the government gave only partial coverage for this
exchange rate guarantee.  Moreover, the minimum financing period requirement for imports was lifted.  Both of changes induced
private agents to reduce their short-term foreign liabilities.
41Given that construction has the smallest share in output, it showed the largest proportional decline, falling by 25 percent. 
This compares to a drop of 7 percent for other private non-traded goods and to a descent of 12.9 percent in private tradeables.exchange rate rose by 13.1, the relative price of tradeables vs. nontradeables by 7.7 percent and the ratio
of the WPI for imports to the CPI by 6.1 percent (Table Error! Bookmark not defined.). The decline in
output can be explained by the fact that inventory dishoarding increased the effective supply of goods at
a moment when final demand was crumpling. This effect was further amplified by the fact that inventories
were mostly composed of domestic goods and not imports, due to the presence of controls during the
period of non-adjustment. Moreover, trade liberalization and the unification and devaluation of the nominal
exchange reduced the value of implicit tariffs, thus causing domestic relative prices to shift less than border
prices, which are those measured in the IMF-definition of the real exchange rate.
        Even though the proportional decline in construction was much larger than the fall in other other
private non-tradeables (25 percent vs. 7 percent) its relative price was not affected. However, both sectors
did fall with respect to tradeables given real depreciation. However, the construction bust cannot be
explained by a fall in aggregate savings, since these actually increased.
                                             Turning now to the issue of the efficiency of adjustment (Table 25) we see
an increase in the secondary costs of adjustment of 13.5 percent of GDP, leaving output 8.3 percent below
the trend. Under-adjustment was eliminated leaving a small excess adjustment of 1.9 percent of GDP.
Actual adjustment costs amounted to 17.9 percent, 46.4 percent of which were secondary (i.e. inefficient).
This contrasts markedly with the figures for 1983, when less than one quarter of the much larger actual
adjustment costs were secondary. Thus, it can be concluded that adjustment in 1989 was more inefficient
than in 198342.
VIII. Lessons and Conclusions
          We have analyzed two permanent negative oil shocks and concentrated on the feature which
distinguish a them form positive shocks: the fact that the solvency of the government is questioned, making
the policy regime unsustainable unless prompt fiscal action is taken. The two shocks were similar in many
respects: they were unexpected, of comparable magnitudes, they struck the economy just after the
completion of stabilization efforts which had left the public and external accounts in surplus and had
increased unemployment. Moreover, the shocks appeared at similar points in the five year political cycle
and with the government committed to fiscal expansion. In both cases, the arrival of the shock was
followed by a period of non-adjustment: real relative absorption was not cut leaving the trade balance to
bear the brunt of the fall in external income.
       Due to the lack of fiscal adjustment, the reaction of private agents was dominated by strategies
designed to avoid the costs associated with the eventual public default. However, since the two shocks took
place under very different exchange rate regimes, the strategies open to private agents and the policy
instruments available to the government were quite different. In 1982, under a single fixed exchange rate,
private agents could protect the value of their domestic financial assets by converting them into dollars at
the set peg. They did so to the tune of 6.5 billion dollars in 1982. Moreover, they could stockpile imported
goods. By contrast, in 1986 the multiple exchange rate regime severely limited the efficacy of these
strategies. The attempt to transform domestic assets into foreign assets led to a rise in the exchange rate
premium and to a fall in the dollar value of domestic assets, rather than to an increase in the stock of
42Said differently, more of the actual adjustment costs went to reduce output and less to improve the balance of payments.dollars. Thus, in spite of more than 1 billion dollars of seniorage issued between 1986 and 1988, the dollar
value of base money fell by 1.2 billion dollars. Furthermore, since imports were rationed, speculative
stockpiling had to take place through the purchase of domestic storable goods.
           This more restricted set of defensive strategies on the part of private agents explains why the
government was able to maintain the period of non-adjustment for three years before being forced to take
corrective measures, a fact which is in stark contrast with the swiftness of the collapse in 1982-1983. From
the macroeconomic point of view, this would imply that multiple exchange rate regimes are more robust
to external shocks than single pre-determined pegs.
                                                 There are other characteristics which make non-adjustment under multiple
regimes politically more attractive. Since inventory accumulation is directed towards domestic goods, it has
a positive impact on output. Also, since imports are restricted, the relative price of domestic tradeables is
protected from severe real appreciation as implicit tariffs rise with excess demand for foreign exchange.
By contrast, under fixed exchange rates, stockpiling affects mostly imports and is financed through a
reduction in spending on non-tradeables and on domestically produced tradeables, thus having a
contractionary impact on output. This effect is enhanced by the fact that the fixed exchange rate does not
provide a compensating stimulus to traceable output. In the Venezuelan case, there was significant real
appreciation in 1982. Hence, nonadjustment is expansionary under multiple exchange rates and
contractionary under fixed rates.
        Many of these advantages work in the opposite direction as soon as the balance of payments collapse
forces the government to act. As agents now try to restructure their wealth portfolios, they quickly run
down their inventories. In the case of fixed exchange rates, these are constituted mostly of imported goods,
while with multiple rates they are composed of domestic goods. Therefore, dishoarding has rather different
effects: it mostly improves the balance of payments in the first case, while it brings down domestic output
in the second. This explains in part why the recession was much more severe and the adjustment more
inefficient in 1989 than in 1983, even though the cut in absorption was smaller.
     The inventory cycle plays itself out in three periods: stockpiling during nonadjustment, dishoarding
immediately after the collapse and a return to balance thereafter. This means that part of the sudden
improvement in the trade balance during the year of the collapse is not sustainable, as it is based on
dishoarding, but inventory change will not remain negative for long. Hence, while the negative swing in
1983 reduced real relative absorption by 19 percent of GDP, explaining about two thirds of the
improvement in the trade balance, in 1984 there was a positive inventory swing of 11.7 percent of GDP,
as dishoarding ended. This expansionary effect took place in the context of a major fiscal adjustment which
reduced other forms of absorption.
     During the second shock, the decline in inventories in 1989 amounted to 12.5 percent of GDP (Table
21). This means that in 1990 the end of dishoarding must have had an important positive impact on
absorption. How that effect was accommodated is not discussed for lack of data, but evidence of GDP
growth of approximately 4 percent and stagnant imports suggests that domestic output accommodated the
increase in demand. Hence, the fall in GDP during the first year of adjustment may be mostly a short-run
phenomenon that will disappear in the next phase of the inventory cycle.
         Also, during the years of balance of payments crisis, i.e. 1983 and 1989, dishoarding generated excessdomestic supply of tradeables causing output in this sector to drop, in spite of an important depreciation
in the IMF measure of the real exchange rate.  Domestic relative prices changed by much less than border
prices or in fact moved in opposite directions, as happened in 1983. Only in the following year after the
collapse do you get a supply response of tradeables, which takes place in the context of an increase in
demand given the now positive swing in inventories.
          The analysis presented leads to some insights into the issue of construction busts. While both
shocks were eventually followed by a decline in construction activity, the start of the collapse was very
different. During the first shock, construction output declined in 1982, i.e. the period of non-adjustment,
in spite of an important increase in public investment. By contrast, the construction sector grew in line with
aggregate output during the 1986-88 period of non-adjustment, in spite of an important decline in domestic
savings. We have explained this disparity by noting that different exchange regimes affect the relative
attractiveness of real estate as a form of safeguarding assets, when a regime collapse is expected. Under
fixed exchange rates, foreign assets and imported goods are preferred. Under multiple rates, real estate
competes mostly with domestically produced stocks of goods as a store of value. In this context, it has the
advantage of a lower rate of depreciation.
        From a political economy viewpoint, it is not at all clear that the ability of multiple exchange regimes
to prevent capital flight makes for better policymaking. It is reasonable to expect politicians faced with a
negative shock to put off decisions until after the next election. In our two cases, the government
attempted to do just that. In 1983, it fell short of the target in spite of the short distances involved. By
contrast, the multiple exchange rate regime, by allowing a postponement of adjustment through a limitation
of the ability of economic agents to protect themselves against the eventual default losses, permitted the
government to drag its feet for three years in 1986-1988. Hence, robustness may limit the degree to which
markets discipline governments into responsible behaviour. Furthermore, we find evidence that the
collapse under multiple exchange rates may lead to more inefficient adjustment with heavier costs in terms
of output.
         Managing instability in an oil exporting economy is an unresolved problem. The traditional idea of
stabilization funds may be quite unworkable. In this framework, the government starts by fixing a baseline
projection of oil income and then saves or dissaves the difference between that level and actual income.
If we assume export revenues to follow a Martingale process, then there is no justification for any baseline
projection. In this sense, the dismal Venezuelan experience at this guessing game is very telling.
           Moreover, matters get more complicated once we take into account the asymmetry between positive
and negative shocks.  If a negative shock occurs and the government decides to finance the gap by drawing
down the resources it has saved in its stabilization fund, economic agents may interpret this behavior as
non-adjustment to a permanent shock and will launch a pre-emptive attack.
        Finally, we may now turn to the initial question: was the Venezuelan mess a case of dancing out of
step or of stepping out of line? Clearly, there was a bit of both. With shocks appearing just as the
government had committed itself to fiscal expansion, there was clearly a lack of the needed synchrony that
makes for elegant dancing. But putting off adjustment must definitely count as a misdemeanor.
Government spending is too rigid a process to make for an adequate partner to the frivolous oil revenue.
In its attempt to dance to such a boisterous tune, the government is bound to find itself stepping out of
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Summary Data on the Two Shocks
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(1) Second Semester of each year (2) December-December (3) December of each year (a) Arithmetic Difference
(b) Annual Rate of Change (c) Accumulated percentage change
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela
Table 2. A summary of macroeconomic events in Venezuela.Period External
Situation





1- Fixed unified exchange rates
2- Fiscal discipline
3- Import substitution indutrialization
1- High but falling rate of growth (average 6.8percent)







1- Expansionary fiscal policy
2- Emphasis on publicly owned basic industries
3- Nationalizations and restrictions on foreign
investment
1- Acceleration in growth (9 percent)
2- Higher inflation but lower than world levels (9 percent)
3- Large and declining surpluses in fiscal and external





1- Increase in public spending mainly in state
enterprises
2- Some attempts to cut back spending and credit
1- Decline in growth (3.5% in 1978)
2- Major external and fiscal deficits





2- Jump in world
interest rates
1- Stong fiscal contraction (mainly in imports)
2- Price liberalization
3- Wage increase law
4- Some trade liberalization
5- Interest ceilings do not adjust
fully for the rise in world rates
1- Growth falls to zero.
2- Unemployment grows slowly.
3- Inflation accelerates to record levels (21 percent in 1980)
4- Real exchange rate appreciates strongly
5- External and fiscal balance achieved.




high starts to fall
1- Fiscal expansion in public works
2- Interest rates are freed but
monetary policy is expansionary
3- Large deficits in public enterprise sector
financed through foreign borrowing
1- Mediocre growth (1 percent)
2- High but falling inflation (16 percent)
 3- Large current account deficit and massive capital outflow
(8bUS$ in 1982)
1983 1- Fall in oil
income
2- Start of debt
crisis





5-Generalized price controls are adopted
1- GDP falls 5 percent.
2- Inflation kept at 7 percent
3- Large balance of payments
4- Still important fiscal deficit
5- Large expansion in money supply






1-Devaluation of official rate
2- Maintenance of import controls
3- Fiscal cuts
4- Interest rate controls adopted
5- Price controls are relaxed
6- Debt strategy: simple rescheduling
1- After an additional contraction in 1984 (-2%), economy
starts to grow in 1985 (3.5%). Unemployment reaches peak.
2- Inflation increases to moderate levels (15%)






1- Fiscal expansion adopted
2- Forced financing of imports
3- Major devaluation when
4- No change in interest rate ceilings
1- Economy grows at 5 % average. Unemployment
falls back to 7%
2- Major balance of payments and fiscal deficit
3- Acceleration of inflation to over 30 %.
4- Floating rate depreciates by almost 200 % over the
period
1989 Small oil income
increase
1- Exchange rate system unified in a floating
arrangement
2- Interest rates and prices freed.
3- Trade and foreign investment liberalized
4- Subsidies cut, public sector prices increased
1- GDP drops by almost 10 points and inflation exceeds 80
percent
2- Exchange rate unified close to parallel rate
3- Current account surplus and small fiscal deficit
Table 3Oil Exports: actual and projected by the VI National Plan (1981-1985)
(Millions of US $)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Projected exports 18273 20466 22922 25672 28753
Actual exports 19094 15659 13667 14634   13144
Percentage difference 4.5% -23.5% -40.4% -43.0%  -54.3%
Source: VI National Plan, CORDIPLAN (1981) and Central Bank of Venezuela.
Table 4
Oil Exports: actual and projected by ~e VI National Plan (1981-1985)
(Millions of US $)
1985 1986 1987 1988
High Scenario 15280 16800 19180 21400
Baseline Scenario 14800 15740 17360 19300
Low Scenario 13060 13740 14580 16120
Actual 13144 7592 9104 8158
Percentage difference
-High -14.0% -54.8% -52.5% -61.9%
-Baseline -11.2% -51.8% -47.ó% -57.7%
-Low 0.ó% -44.7% -37.ó% -49.4%
Source: VII National Plan, CORDIPLAN (1984) and Central Bank of Venezuela.Table 5
Estimated and actual oil exports
(millions of dollars)
Predicted Actual % Predicted  Growth
Exports Exports Diff. Growth Error
1978 10737 8535 -20.5%
1979 gg41 13517 36.0% 16.5% 16.7%
1980 13482 17959 33.2%  -0.3% 33.ó%
1981 20189 18863 -ó.ó% 12.4% -16.9%
1982 20894 15395 -26.3% 10.8% -33.5%
1983 16013 13714 -14.4% 4.0% -17.7%
1984 13912 14670 5.4% 1.4% 4.0%
1985 14824 12820 -13.5% 1.1 % -14.4%
1986 12774 7117 -44.3% -0.4% -44.1 %
1987 8700 9054 4.1 % 22.2% -14.9 %
1988 9265 8136 -12.2% 2.3% -14.2%
1989 8877 9862 11.1 % 9.1 % 1.8%
Average -4.0% 7.2% -9.0%
Standard 23.9% 7.ó% 21.9%
Deviation
Source: Exposición de Motivos del Proyocto de Ley de Preso Duesto,
various years, Oficina Central de Presupuesto and Petróleo y Otros
Datos Estadísticos, Ministerio de Energía y Minas, various issues.Table 6
The decomposition of the first oil shock
Accumulated Effects as Shares of Non-oil GDP
1982 1983 1984 1985
Relative Real External Shock -8.9% -11.3% -9.8% -14.1 %
-Absolute Reai External Shock -8.4% -11.8% -10.6% -14.1 %
-Export Volume effect -4.7% -5.7% -5.3% -7.3%
-Real price effect -3.8% -6.4% -5.6% -7.3%
-0il Price effect -3.0% -5.3% -3.8% -5.1 %
-Import Price effect 0.8% 1.2% 1.9% 2.4%
-GDP growth effect 0.ó% -0.ó% -0.9% 0.0%
Real Depreciation -2.0% -0.7% 6.1 % 5.0%
-Inflation differential -2.0% -4.0% -6.6% -8.6%
-Nominal devaluation 0.0% 3.4% 13.5% 14.8%
Total Decomposed Effect -10.7% -11.9% -4.4% -9.9%
Actual Change -10.1 % -11.5% -4.2% -9.5%
Statistical discrepancy -0.7% -0.5% -0.1% 0.2%
Table 7
Macroeconomic Adjusmtent to the First Oil Shock
Cumulative effects as shares of non-oil GDP
1982 1983 1984 1985
Relative Real External Shock -8.9% -11.3% -9.8% -14.1 %
Change in Trade Balance -12.3% 12.8% 16.1 % 11.9%
Relative absorption growth 1.2% -26.ó% -20.3% -22.ó%
Relative price effects 3.4% 8.0% -2.0% 0.7%
-real depreciation effect -2.0% -0.7 % 6.1 % 5.0%
-relative absorption price effect 1.3% 7.2% 3.9% 5.7%
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 % -0.8 % -0.5 % - 1.5 %Table 8
Savings and Investment by type of agent
(as share of non-oil GDP)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Domestic Savings 46.0 39.3 29.6 21.0 31.0 28.2
-Public 26.9 21.5 12.6 12.9 15.6 13.3
-Private 19.1 17.8 17.0 8.1 15.3 14.9
Total Investment 35.1 32.4 35.7 13.6 22.9 23.4
Fixed Investment 35.8 34.4 33.5 22.7 21.0 21.9
-Public 17.5 21.0 23.6 17.1 7.3 8.6
-Private 18.3 13.4 9.8 5.6 13.7 13.3
Inventories -0.7 -2.1 2.3 -9.1 1.9 1.5
Foreign Savings -10.9 -7.0 6.1 -7.4 -8.1 -4.8
Source: International Monetary Fund and Central Bank of Venezuela
Table 9
Decomposition of the relative absorption effect
Cumulative changes as shares of non-oil GNP
1982 1983 1984 1985
Total Absorption 1 . 2 % -26. 6% -20.3% -22.6 %
-Non-tradeables -0.5% -1.1 % -2.6% -3.4%
  -Public 0.4% 1.0% 1.5% 0.9%
  -Private -1 .0 % -2.3 % -4.5 % -4.7 %
-Tradeables -1.7% -25.7% -18.2% -19.9%
-Consumption -0.2% -4.1 % -4.4% -7.8%
-Public -0.8% -0.4% -0.9% -0.9%
-Private 0.6% -3.8% -3.7% -3.7%
-Tradeables -1.3% -7.0% -9.1 % -12.1 %
-Non-tradeables 1 . 2 % 2.9 % 5.6 % 5.2 %
-Investment -1 . 8 % -9.1 % - 13.1 % - 12.5 %
-Tradeables -0. 1% -4.4 % -4.6 % -3.5 %
-Local 0.0% -1.5% -1.5% -1.2%
-Imported -0.3% -2.3% -2.7% -1.9%
-Non-tradeables -1 .9 % -4.5 % -9.0% -9.4 %
-Inventories 3.2% -15.8% -4.1 % -4.1 %
Table 10
Calculation of the oil exchange tax 1981-19851981 1982 1983 1984 1985
(1) 0il operating surplus (Bs.) 7119 5706 5098 8029 7287
49 9 2 9
(2) 0il Exports ($) 1909 1565 1377 1462 1276
49 8 7 1
Implicit surplus share* (Bs./$) 3.73 3.64 3.70 5.49 5.71
(3) Constant real surplus share* (Bs./$) 373 3 93 4.20 4.64 5.16
(4) Corresponding oil surplus (2*3.) 7119 6149 5792 6790 6580
40 5 8 3
(5) 0il exchange tax (1-4) .0 -4421 -6936 1238 7076
4
-as a share of non-oil GDP (%) 0.0 -1.6 -2.4 3.9 2.0
*: Calculated by multiplying the implicit surplus share by the non-oil GDP deflator and dividing by the US Wholesale price index.
Source: International Monetarv Fund
Table 11
Estimated real transfers to the public sector
(as shares of non-oil GDP)
1982 1983 1984 1985
Seniorage -1.2 4.0 -0.5 2.3
Exchange profits 0.0 3.6 4.2 4.3
0il exchange tax -1.6 -2.4 3.9 2.0
Total transfers -2.8 5.1 7.6 8.6
Source: International Monetary Fund for Base Money, Exchange Profits and nonoil GDP. Table 10 for oil exchange tax.Table 12
GDP growth by sector
percentane chanae as shares of non oil GDP
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Non-oil GDP 0.4% 1.8% -3.7% -1.2% 3.3%
  -Private -0.3% 0.3% -3.8% -1.9% 3.0%
     -Tradeables -0.3% 0.5% -0.5% 0.7% 1.4%
     -Non-tradeables 0.0% -0.2% -3.3% -2.7% 1.6%
         -Construction -0.2 % -0.6 % -0.8 % - 1.4% -0.4%
         -Other 0.2% 0.4% -2.5% -0.8% 2.0%
  -Public 0.7% 1.5% 0.1 % 0.6% 0.3%
      -Tradeables -0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5%
      -Non-tradeables 1.0% 0.7% -0.2% 0.2% -0.2%
Table 13
Relative price shifts 1981-1985
(Index 1980 = 100)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Trad. vs. non-trad.* 98.0 94.7 90.7 95.7 101.5
Real exchange rate# 89.3 79.6 82.3 96.2 97.8
Construction vs. non-trad& 94.6 94.4 90.1 88.5 89.5
Ratio of GDP deflators for tradeables (agriculture and manufacturing) vs. non-tradeables (construction, commerce, transport,
services).
# IMF definition of the real exchange rate, trade weighted average.
& Ratio of Construction GDP deflator to total non-traceable deflator. Source: CORDIPLAN/ILPES database (for deflators)
and Central Bank for the real exchange rate.
Table 14
How Efficient was the Adjustment to the First Shock?
as percentage of trend non-oil GNP
1982 1983 1984 1985
External Shock 9.8% 12.8% 11.6% 15.9%
Primary Absorption Costs 7.8 % 11.8 % 10.4% 15.4%
Secondary Adjustment Costs 1.5% 7.9% 11.7% 11.1%
Total Adjustment Costs 9.4% 20.7% 23.3% 28.2%
Actual Adjustment 0.8% 33.9% 30.8% 32.9%
Excess Adjustment -7.9% 11.0% 6.1% 3.7%
Note: Primary adjustment cost Is equal to the external shock minus the initial output absorption gap.
Table 1 5
Assets changes during the first oil shock(millions of dollars)
Table 1 6
The decomposition of the second oil shock
Accumulated Effects as Shares of Non-oil GDP
1986 1987 1988 1989
Relative Real Externai Shock -10.3% -9.1% -13.4% -9.8%
-Absolute Real External Shock -9.1 % -7.2% -10.8% -8.S%
-Export Volume effect 2.ó% 2.5% 4.3% 4.1%
-Real price effect -11.4% -9.5% -14.5% -12.1%
-0il Price effect -10.8% -7.7% -10.7% -7.2%
-Import Price effect 0.7% 1.9% 4.4% 5.5%
-GDP growth effect 1.3% 2.0% 3.0% 1.5%
Real Depreciation 3.7% 8.2% 12.3% 27.5%
-Inflation differential -1.5% -3.1% -4.ó% -11.3%
-Nominal devaluation 5.2% 11.7% 17.8% 43.7%
Total Decomposed Effect -7.0% -1.ó% -2.8% 14.9%
Actual Change -8.8% -4.1 % -ó.0% 8. 2%
Statistical discrepancy -1.8% -2.5% -3.2% -5.8%
Table 1 7
Macroeconomic Adjustment to the Second Oil Shock
Cumulative effects as shares of non-oil GDP
1986 1987 1988 1989
Relative Real External Shock -10.3% -9.1% -13.4% -9.8%
Change in Trade Balance -8.0% -6.7% -11.9% 9.6%
Relative absorption growth -2.7% -2.2% 0.3% -10.4%
Relative price effects -1.3% -0.2% -3.5% -13.8%
-real depreciation effect 3.7% 8.2% 12.3% 27.5%
-relative absorption price effect 2.3% 8.1 % 8.4% 9.9%
Statistical Discrepancy 1.6% -0.2% 1.4% 6.5%
Table 18
Savings and Investment by type of agent
(as share of non-oil GDP)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Domestic Savings 31.0% 28.2% 22.3% 27.6% 23.7% 26.4%
-Public (1) 15.6% 13.3% 6.4% 7.2% 4.6% 12.4%
-Private 15.3% 14.9% 15.8% 20.3% 19.1% 14.0%
Total Investment 22.9% 23.4% 23.6% 29.7% 31.9% 17.0%
Fixed Investment 21.0% 21.9% 23.0% 25.4% 26.1% 22.4%
-Public 7.3% 8.ó% 10.7% 10.9% 12.0% 11.9%
-Private 13.7% 13.3% 12.3% 14.5% 14.1% 10.5%
Inventories 1.9% 1.5% 0.6% 4.3% 5.9% -5.4%
Foreign Savings -8.1% -4.8% 1.3% 2.2% 8.3% -9.4%
-Resource Balance -10.2% -7.4% 0.5% 2.3% 7.6% -16.1 %
-Current transfers 2.1 % 2.ó% 0.9% -0.1 % 0.6% 6.7%
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela: National Accounts for 1 984-1989. (1 ) As calculated by the Central Bank's Public Finance Division.Table 1 9
Calculation of the oil exchange tax 1985-1989
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
(1) 0il operating surplus (Bs.) 72879 51130 92472 99631 305606
(2) 0il Exports ($) 12761 7049 8927 8023 9862
Implicit surplus share (1/2) 5.71 7.25 10.36 12.42 30.99
(Bs./$)
(3) Constant real surplus share 5.71 6.49 7.88 9.41 15.10
(4) Corresponding oil surplus 72879 45782 70385 75528 148903
(2*3.)
(5) 0il exchange tax (1-4) 0 5348 22087 24103 156703
-as a share of non-oil GDP (%) 0.0 1.3 3.9 3.2 13.9
*: Calculated by multiplying the implicit surplus share by the non-oil GDP deflator and dividing by the US Wholesale price
index.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
Table 20
Estimated real transfers to the public sector
(as shares of non-oil GDP)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real value of Seniorage 2.3 1.1 1.8 1.7 2.2
Real value of exchange profits 4.3 1.6 -2.1 -2.9 -2.7
0il exchange tax 0.0 1.3 3.9 3.2 13.9
Total transfers 6.6 4.0 3.6 2.0 13.4
Source: international Monetary Fund for Base Money, Exchange Profits and non-oil GDP. Table 19 for oil exchange tax.
Table 21
Decomposition of the absolute absorption effect
Yearly changes as shares of non-oil GDP
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Relative Absorption  Effect -2.9 -2.7 0.5 2.6 -10.5
Absolute Absorption Effect 1.0 4.2 7.1 9.9 -20.9
-Public 1.6 3.5 0.1 3.0 -2.4
  -Consumption -0.2 0.7 0.4 1.4 -0.2
  -Investment 1.8 2.7 -0.3 1.7 -2.4
-Private -0.6 0.6 6.9 6.7 -18.9
  -Consumption 0.2 2.4 3.2 4.0 -5.1
  -Investment -0.4 -0.9 0.5 0.5 -4.7
  -Inventories -0.4 -0.9 3.2 2.4 -10.1
-Statistical Discrepancy 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -
0.3Table 22
Table 23.
GDP growth by sector
percentage change as shares of non-oil GDP
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Non-oil GDP 3.4% 5.9% 5.4% 5.7% -9.7° /0
-Private 3.0% 5.0% 4.5% 4.9% -9.8%
-Tradeables 1.4% 2.ó% 1.8% 0.4% -3.7%
-Non-tradeabies 1.ó% 2.5% 2.8% 4.ó% -ó.4%
-Construction -0.4% 0.9% 0.3% 0.9% -3.3%
-Other 2.0% 1.6% 2.5% 3.7% -3.1 %
-Public 0.3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 0.2%
-Tradeables 0.5% 0.4% 0.ó% 0.5% -0.2%
-Non-tradeabies -0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.5%
Table 24
Relative price shifts 1985-1989
(Index 1984 = 100)
1985 1986 1987 1988         1989
Trad. vs. non-trad. 104.2 104.2 97.9 95.4 102.7
Real exchange rate# 101.7 103.7 169.2 157.9 178.6
Construction vs. non-trad & 101.5 99.7 100.4 101.1 101.5
WPI (imported) vs. CPI@ 106.1 110.1 123.2 114.0 120.9
Ratio of GDP deflators for tradeables (agriculture and manufacturing) vs. non-tradeabies (construction, commerce,
transport, services).
# IMF definition of the real exchange rate, trade weighted average.
& Ratio of Construction GDP deflator to total non-traceable deflator.
@ Ratio of wholesale price index of imported goods to consumer price index.
Source: Central 8ank of Venezuela.
Table 25
How Efficient was the Adjustment to the Second Shock?
As shares of trend non-oil GDP
1986 1987 1988 1989
Ext ernal Shock 9.9 % 8.5 % 12.6 % 9 0 %
Primary Absorption Costs 7.9 % 6.2 % 11.3 % 6 8 %
Secondary Adjustment Costs -2.0% -3.5% -5.2% 8.3%
Total Adjustment Costs 5.8 % 2.5 % 5.5 % 15.7 %
Actual Adjustment 0.5% -1.7% -ó.1 % 17.9%
Excess Adjustment -5.0% -4 1 % -11.0% 1.9%
Note: Primary adjustment cost is equal to the external shock minus the initial output absorption gap.Table 26
Assets changes during the second oil shock
(millions of dollars)
Levels 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
International Reserves 1197 8206 7280 2385 2452 4506
6
Dollar value of Base
Money
3112 2156 1998 1880 2251 3913
Yearly changes
International Reserves 1692 -3770 -926 -4895 67 2054
Dollar value of Base
Money
110 -956 -157 -119 371 1662
Dollar value of
seniorage#
583 223 356 371 636 2057
Year-end nominal value of the base money divided by the year-end financial exchange
rate.
   # Year-end nominal increase in base money divided by the yearly average financial
exchange rate.
Source: IMF Recent Economic Developments several Years.
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Figure 1
Oil exports at constant 1990 prices
Figure 2
Absolute and Reiative External Oil Shocks
cumulative Effects 1969-1989